Written by: Bob Woodward
487 pages
ISBN: 1-4165-5897-7
Editorial Simon & Shuster
$32.00
5 stars
Woodward’s fourth book on the Bush presidency examines the president’s decision-making process and how he guided the war through 2006 and early 2008. The writing is crisp and crisp. Woodward’s observations and conclusions will leave the reader speechless.
Woodward opens the book with a cast of characters to help the reader understand the major decision makers involved in the war. Woodward then brings the reader to a hard landing as he discusses the escalating violence in Iraq and how the generals on the ground, Casey and Abizaid, seemed oblivious to the fighting, focusing more on the “numbers” because that’s what the president wanted. . see.
As Casey and Abizaid work to reduce their size, conditions on the ground don’t allow it. In early 2006, President Bush realizes the strategy isn’t working, but instead of going through more traditional channels like the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff for answers, he tasks his Security Advisor with President Stephen Hadley to conduct a study to determine why the war strategy is failing and what can be done to fix it. As Hadley pursues this agenda through clandestine channels, the bipartisan Iraq think tank is formed with five ranking Democrats and five ranking Republicans to determine the war strategy and offer suggestions for fixing it.
During the summer of 2006, Hadley and the study group, working independently, conducted numerous intensive interviews. Also shaking things up behind the scenes is retired General Jack Keane, who has a laser-sharp understanding of Iraqi society, his leadership, and what the US can do to bolster his strategy. Keane guides the game’s key players toward a viable strategy that just might work. It is Keane who inspires General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to convene a council of colonels to examine America’s war effort. It is Keane who recommends General David Petraeus to replace General Casey, and it is Keane who has a side door “inside” with Chaney and Bush.
The Bush strategic review by Hadley and the Iraqi think tank ends around the same time, about six or seven months after it began. Most of the Bush team’s recommendations mirror those of the study group, including a surge. Unfortunately, as Woodward points out, it took Bush six to seven months to achieve a change in strategy, something that should have happened on a tighter schedule. Another change is the result of pure partisan politics: Bush waited until after the November 2006 election and the loss of both houses of Congress to the Democrats to let Rumsfeld go, implying that if the Republicans kept Congress, they would Rumsfeld would have stayed.
Bush holds no one responsible, not Rumsfeld, Casey or Abizaid, who each receive a promotion. His lack of a timetable for a new strategy prolongs the destruction in Iraq. He doesn’t seek advice from those on the ground to give it to him: the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Woodward’s writing is strict. She breaks down the hard-to-follow topics in such a way that the reader understands the situation and the consequences of Bush’s action. “The War Within” is a fascinating study of the president himself, his makeup, and the legacy he will leave behind for the nation.
